South China Sea Turbulence - A treat for Vietnam, a trick for the World

This file photo shows Chinese Navy vessels during military exercises. China is staging three days of military exercises in the South China Sea and plans to boost its offshore maritime patrol force, state media said, as tensions with its neighbours simmer. (AFP/XINHUA/File/Zha Chunming)

Wednesday, June 22, 2011
Op-Ed by Khmer Academy

The rising tensions in South China Sea spark a renewed concern over the regional stability and global implications. Clearly, it is no longer just a matter of the territorial claims and counter-claims among neighboring countries in the region, but also a complex and dangerous arm wrestling between Eastern and Western superpowers.

Whether justified or not, the West views South China Sea tensions as China’s increasing assertiveness in the region. Along with that view, the West has directly and indirectly incited the countries involved in the dispute to stand up to China. Such maneuver does not in any way contribute to a peaceful resolution; on the contrary, it only serves to escalate the tensions and hostility. It is not by coincident that some concerned countries in the region, Vietnam in particular, are already using the dispute and capitalizing on the waves of China-bashing sentiment in the West to advance their own hidden agendas.

The recent naval drill conducted by Vietnam in South China Sea has perplexed some observers and raised several interesting questions. What truly entice Vietnam to undertake such a bold and defying exercise? Given the enormous disparity between the Chinese and the Vietnamese navies, what are the real motives behind Vietnam’s naval drill?

Despite its appearance of a normal or routine annual exercise, it is arguable that the drill was intentionally aimed to provoke China, with the hope to trick the latter to instigate military clashes, in which case Vietnam would stand to benefit from an outburst of international supports and sympathy. It is the same tactics used by Vietnam in the past conflicts to mobilize the international supports. From its seasoned experiences of the war against American imperialism in the 60′s and the 70′s, Vietnam knows full well that international supports will be its main weapon in an eventual armed confrontation with China.

More importantly, Vietnam wants to send an unequivocally clear signal that it stands ready to cooperate with U.S. militarily to counter China rising influence in the region, and that it resolutely commits to such cooperation even it means risking a full scale war with China. Obviously, such a defying move is exceedingly risky and provocative to say the least; yet for Vietnam, it’s a calculated risk and the benefits of forging an alliance with the U.S. far outweigh the risk.

A military alliance with the U.S., and hence generous U.S. military aids, would definitely allow Vietnam to modernize its aging armed forces – something it could not afford either to delay or to do on its own. Furthermore, with the U.S. on its side, Vietnam will have far better chance to claim its share of ownership over the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands. But that’s not all. There is an unpublished agenda which is far more important than the issue of Paracel and Spratly Islands ownership in Vietnam’s overall game plan.

At the fall of Saigon in 1975, Vietnam achieved one of its two sacred goals – unifying the North and the South; but failed the other – annexing Cambodia and Laos under the banner of Indochina Federation. To these days, Vietnam has not given up on that long-held goal, and bitterly viewed China as a major, if not the only, obstacle to the creation of Indochina Federation State (IFS).

Following Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1979, the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements called for a complete withdrawal of Vietnam invading troops from Cambodia, and an immediate cessation of treaties and activities deemed as a violation to Cambodia independence and territorial integrity. Despite being a signatory of the Agreements, Vietnam has yet to fully comply with the terms of the Agreements. Actually, the Vietnamization of Cambodia – demographically, politically and economically – remains as intense as it was three decades ago.

Strategically, the annexation of Cambodia by Vietnam constitutes an elevated, if not an unacceptable, threat to China’s interests and homeland security. For these reasons, the rivalry between China and Vietnam over the control of Cambodia continues to predominantly occupy the center stage of their roller-coaster relationship. Interestingly, key indications on the ground seem to suggest that Vietnam is ahead in the game. While China continues to pour hundreds of millions of dollars into the concretes in Cambodia – mainly building roads, bridges and hydro-power dams – Vietnam unscrupulously and discretely maintains its tight grip on Cambodia ruling party, controlling powerful decision making bodies and coercing the Cambodian government to jail opposition lawmakers and citizens speaking out against Vietnamese interests. At present, millions of Vietnamese ethnics come to settle freely and openly in Cambodia.

Vietnam sees the dispute over the ownership of Paracel and Spratly Islands and the U.S. increasing concern over China rising influence in the region, as a golden opportunity to make a final push on its repeated attempts to annex Cambodia. Through its unusual defiance and provoking maneuver in South China Sea, Vietnam hopes to trigger muscular response from China, lure the U.S. into the conflict, and convince the Americans that it is a credible ally. If armed clashes do erupt and the China’s buildups intensify, Vietnam will have a strong case to persuade the U.S. and some Western nations that Indochina Federation State offers an effective and viable option to contain China.

With the chastening experiences in Vietnam War still haunting our collective memories, it would be unwise for the U.S. to allow itself to be pulled into the South China Sea dispute. Likewise, it would be a huge and costly mistake to consider forming an alliance with or arming Vietnam as a right solution to counter China’s expanding influence. Perhaps, it is worthwhile to remind Uncle Sam of his own advice. During his trip to China in 1971, Henry Kissinger, then National Security Adviser, failed to persuade Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai to halt or reduce Chinese assistances to the Vietnamese combatants. Frustrated, he reportedly told Zou: “One day, it will be your turn to take care of them, and you will then understand what bastards we’re dealing with.”

Khmer Academy