Demilitarised Zone versus de-politicised approach

July 28, 2011
By Suthichai Yoon
The Nation

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) may have ordered Thai and Cambodian troops to withdraw from the “Provisional Demilitarised Zone” but things on the border and domestic politics on both sides aren’t as simple as viewed in The Hague.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, the current Asean chair, has publicly expressed satisfaction that both Thailand and Cambodia have said they will respect ICJ’s July 18 order to set up the 17-square-kilometre DMZ next to the Phra Viharn/Preah Vihear Temple.But public intentions and actual implementation are two different things and both Bangkok and Phnom Penh have their own reasons for dilly-dallying until things fit their agenda before showing their respect for the World Court’s verdict.

Cambodian Premier Hun Sen has said his government won’t pull out its troops from the designated DMZ until Thailand agrees to a timetable. In addition, he also ruled out bilateral talks on a timetable with Thailand. Hun Sen wants Indonesia to be on the same negotiation table for the talks to reach any meaningful conclusion.

Thailand has publicly said it is ready to go along with the verdict. But there are a few – and not necessarily simple – things to be cleared up in the domestic scene before any concrete action can be taken.

First, acting Premier Abhisit Vejjajiva has said that how military withdrawal could be effected should be an issue to be hammered out by the General Border Committee (GBC). That practically means that Thailand only wants the troop pullout on both sides of the border to be a bilateral issue – not a trilateral topic. Thailand wants only two parties to be involved. Cambodia wants at least three.

Then, there is the question of Thailand’s own political transition after the July 3 election. Even if Hun Sen has welcomed the new government expected to be led by Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister, it doesn’t mean that everything will be plain sailing for the Cambodian side with the change of administrations. Thailand’s domestic politics are usually more complicated than most people assume anyway.

Even if things should look brighter for Phnom Penh and Bangkok with the installation of a new government, the parliamentary process and constitutional “interpretation” of the world court’s order under the new regime could see road blocks spring up along the way.

For one thing, the new House of Representatives can be convened no earlier than the first or second week of August, after which a new prime minister will be voted in around the middle of next month. If everything goes as planned, the new premier will form her Cabinet by the end of August.

But that doesn’t mean the new government could go about ordering the withdrawal of troops from the proposed DMZ immediately. The new Council of Ministers is required by law to deliver its policy to Parliament.

Though with its solid majority in the House, the new Pheu Thai-led coalition government should get its policy statement approved without much difficulty, things may not move along quite as smoothly as the new government would like to see when it comes to the sensitive issue of territorial integrity with neighbours.

Some lawmakers, especially those in the Democrat Party-led opposition, will likely cite the provisions of Article 190 in the Constitution that requires prior parliamentary approval before the government can enter into any agreement with a foreign country that is related to “territorial integrity and issues that could provide far-reaching consequences on national security and economic, as well as social, areas.”

Both the Democrats, who were running the country until they lost badly in the July 3 election, and Pheu Thai, the opposition-turned-ruling party, have exploited the Thai-Cambodian border issue for their political benefit all along. No doubt, substantial segments of the yellow and red shirts will be adopting opposing stands over this highly controversial “hot potato”. Political polarisation will rear its ugly head once again.

The fact that Hun Sen and Thaksin are close friends suggests, at least superficially, that the hostility that marked the two countries’ relations during Abhisit’s premiership should disappear in favour of a more cordial atmosphere. But that kind of personal closeness between the two could boomerang. If Yingluck can’t handle it, her brother’s close ties with the Cambodian leader could draw criticism of collusion and conflict of interests.

That could undermine any chances of restoring “professional, mutually beneficial” relations between the two countries.

The World Court could declare a “demilitarised zone” on the Thai-Cambodian border. But only the two governments, with or without a third party, can implement a “de-politicised zone” to mark a new beginning of good neighbourly relations.