By Sebastian Strangio
Asia Times Online
PHNOM PENH – As part of its ongoing release of leaked United States diplomatic cables, the anti-secrecy organization WikiLeaks this month released its small cache of Cambodia-related dispatches. The 777 cables from the US Embassy in Phnom Penh – an eagerly awaited bounty for Cambodia-watchers and local analysts – span the period from 1992 to 2010, nearly the entire life of democratic Cambodia.
While nothing in the Phnom Penh cables approaches the incomparable account of a wedding in the post-Soviet Republic of Dagestan in 2006 (a bacchanalia at which Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov “danced clumsily with his gold-plated automatic stuck down the back of his jeans”) (06MOSCOW9533), certain of the dispatches shine a rare light on the faults, foibles and eccentricities of Cambodia’s leadership.
It is surprising perhaps that strongman Prime Minister Hun Sen – the most prominent figure in Cambodia and the one whose personality would likely provide the most grist for analysis – is spared the harsher assessments of US officials. In one dispatch from 1995 (95PHNOMPENH3751), Hun Sen is described as showing evidence of “paranoia” after rumors of an assassination plot cropped up in the local press.
It describes a leader who “continues to show a near-obsession with his personal security” and would not travel outside the city unless accompanied by a retinue of around 60 bodyguards. In later years, Hun Sen showed signs of “increasing maturity”, according to a 2008 cable (08PHNOMPENH694) signed by outgoing US ambassador Joseph Mussomeli, who cited the government’s “restrained” reaction to provocations from Thailand on contested border territory and apparent commitment to democratic reform.
Overwhelmingly, however, the cables paint a picture of a leader adept at flattering and cajoling US officials while playing his own cards close to his chest. “The PM was on a charm offensive that encompassed an hour and a half of discussion peppered with jokes, historical references, and talking points that played to issues of [US government] interest,” stated a cable (06PHNOMPENH361) documenting a meeting between Hun Sen and US Senate staffer Paul Grove.
In her first meeting with Hun Sen in 2009 (09PHNOMPENH79), current ambassador Carol Rodley recalled him “gushingly stating that he spends more of his time with the American ambassador than with any other members of the diplomatic community”. Ahead of the 2008 Cambodian national election, however, another cable (09PHNOMPENH489) described Hun Sen as also presiding over an “autocratic nip-and-tuck” and a “sophisticated, rules-based campaign to chip away at free speech”.
Unlike the prime minister, Cambodia’s feckless royalists provide a target-rich environment for sharp-tongued US diplomats. “Cambodia’s royal family”, states one May 2006 cable (06PHNOMPENH839), “is a tragedy, comedy and melodrama all rolled into one that could have provided grist for at least a half dozen Shakespeare plays.”
A particular target is Prince Norodom Ranariddh, then leader of the Funcinpec party, whose limelight-stealing antics following the October 2004 abdication of King Norodom Sihanouk and the accession of the prince’s half-brother Sihamoni prompted some colorful take-downs from embassy officials.
One cable (04PHNOMPENH1701), titled “Cambodia’s Man Who Won’t Be King – Ranariddh’s Snit Fit”, paints a picture of a prince acting in “childish and petulant” manner, out of apparent pique at being “passed over for a younger half-brother as King”.
In one instance documented in the cable, Ranariddh flew into a rage when he had the central palace gates closed in his face while he was attempting to follow the king’s motorcade, ordering the dismissal of the palace’s head of security; a few days later, he failed to attend a Buddhist coronation ceremony for royals.
“[R]ather than raising his stature,” the cable concluded, “he is increasingly making himself a laughing stock.” In a December 2009 cable (09PHNOMPENH920), following Funcinpec’s implosion at the 2008 national elections, ambassador Rodley wrote that the moribund royalists “don’t have much of a presence, or a future” in Cambodian politics.
In contrast, the cables paint a positive picture of King Sihamoni, describing his “regal” behavior during his coronation (04PHNOMPENH1701). Another dispatch following the coronation (04PHNOMPENH1985) claimed that he had brought “a new sense of dignity to the royal house” and was a welcome change to Sihanouk and the wayward Ranariddh.
“His careful, well-modulated speeches, though prompted as much by his lack of familiarity with his native Khmer as anything, have been a welcome change from the high-pitched speech characteristic of his father and older half brother,” it stated.
The most controversial of the cables is a June 2002 dispatch (02PHNOMPENH1361) detailing long-standing Foreign Minister Hor Namhong’s alleged activities during the murderous Khmer Rouge regime. The short cable, which cites an “undated, unattributed report” on file at the embassy, stated that Hor Namhong – described in a 2008 cable (08PHNOMPENH399) as “aged and sclerotic” – returned to Cambodia after the takeover of the Khmer Rouge in April 1975 and took charge of Boeung Trabek prison, a Khmer Rouge interrogation center in Phnom Penh.
During the Khmer Rouge regime, “he and his wife collaborated in the killing of many prisoners”, the cable states, including members of the royal family, and sentenced one inmate to death for listening to a French radio broadcast. (The prison was liberated by the Vietnamese before the latter sentence could be carried out). Hor Namhong’s wife is cited as saying she “helped [Khmer Rouge leader] Ieng Sary bring back a lot of people to be killed” and that she hoped in exchange that her daughter would be given a role in the communist government.
(Earlier this month, Hor Namhong issued a statement condemning the contents of the cable as “highly defamatory”. He has twice sued opposition leader Sam Rainsy for defamation for making similar claims in his autobiography Rooted in Stone).
Perhaps the most illuminating of the cables, however, is one from August 2007 (07PHNOMPENH1034), titled “Cambodia’s Top Ten Tycoons”, illuminating the rich nexus of politicians, cronies and businessmen that undergirds the rock-solid rule of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP).
Among those profiled is Australian-born Kith Meng, who is described by one source cited in a cable as “a relatively young and ruthless gangster”; another source claims the head of the Royal Group conglomerate – who is blessed with the alias “Mr Rough Stuff” – is “notorious for using his bodyguards to coerce others into brokering deals”.
Particularly close to the prime minister, according to the cable, is Mong Reththy – “Hun Sen’s money man” – who has built a fortune from agriculture and construction, and owns a private port, naturally named after himself, near Sihanoukville on the country’s south coast.
The two leaders reportedly spent time together at a Phnom Penh pagoda during secondary school; in 1997, when Mong Reththy’s name was raised in connection with a seven-ton marijuana bust, Hun Sen “publicly shielded” him from the accusation, according to the cable.
Other tycoons mentioned include CPP Senator Ly Yong Phat, who maintains a formidable economic fief in the southwestern province of Koh Kong; Sok Kong, who heads Sokimex, the country’s largest petroleum supplier that also controls the lucrative ticket revenues from the famous Angkor Wat temple complex; and Lao Meng Khin, a commercial jack-of-all-trades with a seat in the senate, a powerful, well-connected wife and lucrative construction, logging and agribusiness concessions.
According to another leaked cable, Cambodia’s leading businessmen are linked to Hun Sen and the political leadership in a tight mesh of personal relationships and economic accommodations. Hun Sen enjoys a “mutually beneficial” relationship with the country’s oligarchs who donate money towards the CPP in exchange for his personal backing in their business ventures.
This economic in-breeding, the cable concludes, acts to “reinforce the culture of impunity and limit progress on reforms such as Hun Sen’s self-declared ‘war on corruption’.”
Except for Hor Namhong’s angry missive protesting claims he played a significant role in the Khmer Rouge regime, the Cambodian government is unlikely to take the leaks – and their relatively mild disclosures – too seriously. “Information from WikiLeaks is unofficial … [and] from the perspective of one person,” said Phay Siphan, a government spokesman. “It does not represent the official interests of the United States.”
Sebastian Strangio is a journalist based in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. He can be reached at sebastian.strangio@gmail.com
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